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ABSTRACT
Attempts to define morality or stress its 
importance are the center of ethical debates 
that aim to provide guidance for human life. 
Deviating from this goal, Susan Wolf shines a 
light on the significance of “nonmoral virtues” by 
discussing how a moral saint’s life, too immersed 
in morality, could be lacking in other spheres. 
She states that a moral saint’s life would be 
unattractive or dull, as one is not able to value 
or pursue nonmoral activities such as the arts 
or cooking due to one’s commitments under 
moral sainthood. I challenge this argument, 
which belittles moral sainthood in an attempt 
to give more credit to nonmoral qualities in 
life, by arguing that nonmoral virtues could be 
necessary and valuable for a moral saint in 
carrying out her duties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In “Moral Saints,” Susan Wolf explores the extent to which 
human lives should be moral by investigating the qualities abundant 
or lacking in moral saints: those that are considered the ultimate 
role-models of morality. She defines a moral saint as someone whose 
every action is maximally moral and lives solely to devote themselves 
to the welfare of others.1 Although Wolf acknowledges the prevalent 
notion that “one ought to be as morally good as possible,” she argues 
that moral sainthood does not allow room for personal well-being.2 
Wolf then identifies qualities that are valuable, yet do not have a 
moral connotation. These are “nonmoral virtues,” which one can 
achieve through pursuing nonmoral interests, skills, or activities such 
as cultivating one’s talents in art, music, or cooking. Wolf elucidates 
that moral saints lack nonmoral excellence because they do not 
have time for personal projects, as moral sainthood requires the sole 
devotion of one’s life to society’s welfare. Hence, moral saints are “too 
good for [their] own well-being.”3 Wolf then considers examples of 
moral saints whose devotion to moral perfection prevents them from 
pursuing nonmoral excellence. One example is the utilitarian Loving 
Saint, who strives to improve the welfare of others out of genuine love 
for humanity. Wolf explains that a Loving Saint’s commitment to 
utilitarianism gives her “one thought too many” to be able to pursue 
nonmoral virtues with the correct motivations.4 Therefore, Wolf 
argues that moral sainthood is not a desirable form of human life as it 
lacks nonmoral excellence. I think that Wolf’s account is inaccurate 
regarding the role of nonmoral virtues in moral sainthood, particularly 
in that of a utilitarian Loving Saint. I believe that a moral saint can value 
and pursue moral and nonmoral virtues simultaneously; this is possible 
because nonmoral excellences are attached to the fundamental qualities 
of successful moral sainthood.
In section II, I argue that moral saints end up possessing nonmoral 
virtues in their attempts to achieve moral ends. I follow up this 
argument with a potential objection that a moral saint’s possession of 
nonmoral qualities might be coincidental; as a result, one might worry 
that she pursues these excellences in the wrong way.5 Next, I point 
1 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy  79, no. 8 (1982): 419-
20, 10.2307/2026228.2.
2 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 419.
3 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 421-22.
4 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” in Moral Luck: 
Philosophical Papers 1973–1980, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18; quoted in Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 430.
5 She/her/hers pronouns are used for the author’s reference to the Moral/
Loving Saint in this paper.
out that a utilitarian Loving Saint, in particular, would value nonmoral 
interests as a part of her own flourishing as she understands how they 
are crucial to humankind’s flourishing. I then address the concern 
that the Loving Saint’s ability to see values of nonmoral practices in 
others might not extend to herself. Introducing section IV, I consider 
the counterargument that even if a Loving Saint values nonmoral 
interests correctly, her appreciation might be shallow, as she will always 
prioritize morality. I claim that even if the Loving Saint might give up 
nonmoral interests when they conflict with her moral duties, this fact 
does not weaken her attachment to the nonmoral virtues. I suggest that 
she is only valuing nonmoral things from both moral and nonmoral 
perspectives, which can be intrinsically consistent with one’s moral 
sainthood. I conclude this paper with a consideration that nonmoral 
and moral virtues might be interchangeable.
II. CAN MORAL SAINTHOOD REQUIRE NONMORAL 
EXCELLENCE?
Wolf states that,“A moral saint will have to be very, very nice …
as a result, he will have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland.”6 This 
owes to the fact that moral saints are unduly dominated by the desire 
to achieve moral perfection, which subsumes or demotes their other 
desires and requires them to negate the pursuit of nonmoral projects.7 
According to Wolf, these traits make moral saints unattractive or 
undesirable, because they lack nonmoral virtues developed through 
genuine appreciation of nonmoral interests. However, Wolf does 
not consider the possibility that nonmoral virtues might also be 
attainable through moral activities or interests. Achieving moral 
perfection requires tremendous effort, which as a result, can cultivate 
a combination of nonmoral virtues such as rationality, intelligence, 
persistence, courage, or humor in a moral saint. For example, a moral 
saint’s duties that Wolf describes as “feeding the hungry or healing 
the sick or raising money for Oxfam” cannot be done by someone 
who lacks nonmoral virtues.8 One needs to be persistent enough to 
communicate with a starving child who refuses to take medicine, 
rational and intelligent enough to take care of a dying elder who gets 
violent out of pain, witty and personable enough to persuade donors or 
lead an auction for charity, and passionate and courageous enough to 
persist in moral sainthood while facing the burdens of accompanying 
duties. What is required of one to become a moral saint includes 
nonmoral strengths and virtues and pursuing morality does not inhibit 
6 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 422.
7 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 424.
8 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 421.
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one from enriching such human qualities, but rather pushes one to 
develop them. In sum, moral sainthood mandates efforts and skills to 
successfully perform moral activities that capture what Wolf views as 
valuable in nonmoral excellence.
Following this sense, a philosophical concept that might signal 
the essentiality of nonmoral qualities in moral sainthood is the idea 
of phronēsis or practical wisdom. An Aristotelian-inspired concept, 
phronēsis means, “a true and practical state involving reason, concerned 
with what is good and bad for a human being.”9 Phronēsis involves 
the knowledge that enables its possessor to “reason correctly about 
practical matters” to do what is right in any circumstance,10 and only 
those that are morally excellent can possess this ability through life 
experience.11 For instance, if a moral saint’s duties include directing a 
moral organization, she can utilize her practical wisdom in assigning 
the appropriate amount and type of tasks to the right kind of workers 
so that the organization functions well for its purpose. Since phronēsis 
is tied to the ability to make correct decisions involving morality in 
this case, its nonmoral value might not be evident. However, someone 
who is cunning or wicked can also possess the practical knowledge 
involved in phronēsis to commit evil.12 Therefore, this general ability 
to make good choices concerning practical matters to the extent to 
which that could be applied in nonmoral contexts seems to depict a 
nonmoral quality. In other words, phronēsis is not necessarily moral, 
but one cannot become a successful moral saint without it. As practical 
wisdom is an essential element in moral sainthood, this makes a case 
that a moral saint would have to develop a quality that we might classify 
as nonmoral and is therefore perfecting certain nonmoral abilities in 
pursuing a moral life.
With regard to the argument concerning the role of nonmoral 
virtues in moral sainthood, Wolf acknowledged that aspirations 
to moral sainthood can give one a reason to work hard to develop 
nonmoral virtues such as courage.13 While she noted that one might not 
be liable to be successful in developing certain nonmoral virtues such as 
wit and charm for moral reasons, she claimed that the perspective of a 
moral saint can certainly make one appreciate the instrumental value of 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 107.
10 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 12.
11 Gideon Rosen et al., “Virtue Ethics,” in The Norton Introduction to 
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 824; 828.
12 Rosen et al., “Virtue Ethics,” 829.
13 Susan Wolf, email message to author, October 30, 2020.
these qualities in achieving moral ends.14 Here, Wolf highlights how a 
moral saint’s appreciation of such human qualities comes from a moral 
perspective. Even if the moral saint can attain nonmoral excellence 
while pursuing moral perfection, she is not thereby treating nonmoral 
qualities with the correct motivations. In fact, when asked “whether 
the things that we find appealing about the nonmoral excellences might 
be conceived of in such a way that it is purely formal so that those 
abilities might manifest themselves in the moral saint,” Wolf answered 
that, “there’s an incompatibility between moral sainthood, and what I 
find most attractive in these (nonmoral) ideals that is not just about the 
skills or activities that they engage with but about their motivations and 
relationship to these activities.”15 
In short, Wolf is saying that what we value about nonmoral 
virtues is something more than the formal traits describable under the 
very general heading that manifests different sets of nonmoral human 
skills. This leads to a fundamental concern that even if moral saints 
are capable of attaining nonmoral excellence in practice, they are not 
doing so with the correct motivations, as they develop these qualities 
accidentally or supplementally while achieving their moral ends rather 
than directly out of passion with no regards to moral contexts. My reply 
in the next section offers a different view to this discussion.
III. CAN MORAL SAINTS APPRECIATE NONMORAL 
PRACTICES?
Wolf denotes that, “for a moral saint, the existence of these 
(nonmoral) interests or skills can be given at best the status of happy 
accidents.”16 Nevertheless, it does not occur to me that moral saints 
would consider nonmoral interests to be valuable only within their 
contribution to morality and dismiss them when they do not. To 
expand on this point, I will focus on the specific example of Loving 
Saints and how they would be able to value nonmoral interests “for 
their own sakes as distinct, independent aspects of the realization of 
human good.”17 Loving Saints can appreciate nonmoral activities 
outside of the limited circumstances of these values aligning with 
their moral missions by chance. This is because Loving Saints are 
genuinely concerned about the flourishing of other humans, and thus, 
the flourishing of humankind in general, and nonmoral practices are 
the fundamental attributes of life that are crucial to an individual or 
14 Wolf, email message to author.
15 Susan Wolf, (special guest at lecture by John McHugh, Denison University, 
Granville, OH, September 17, 2020).
16 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 425.
17 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 425.
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humankind’s well-being. A Loving Saint pursues morality out of 
love, as she is nice, sacrifices herself to put others’ happiness first, and 
derives happiness from doing so.18 To pursue maximum happiness for 
the whole population, she will be attentive and interested in others’ 
lives and welfare. Then, she will observe how nonmoral interests are 
meaningful in a way that is essential to human lives. For instance, by 
observing someone who devotes thousands of hours into the somewhat 
bizarre act of trying to control a ball with two feet or someone who 
will never trade a childhood art piece even for a million dollars, a 
Loving Saint will come to an understanding that there are things in life 
that people unconditionally love and value. While promoting others’ 
welfare, a Loving Saint will learn how some activities bring meaning 
to others’ lives and that such qualities do not always have to do with 
morality. When she sees that nonmoral activities or interests are crucial 
in human life, she will come to recognize their worth outside of their 
contribution to morality or overall happiness. It is hard to believe that 
a Loving Saint’s attitude toward nonmoral practices would remain 
superficial after the realization of their essentiality for human well-
being. Nonetheless, one can worry that even if a Loving Saint can 
see the true values of nonmoral interests or activities in other people, 
she might still be unable to value them for herself. But once a Loving 
Saint can value nonmoral practices in others, it would be an artificial 
stretch to assume that she will not thereby value them in herself as well. 
A Loving Saint’s goal in life is to maximize overall happiness, which 
includes helping others cultivate nonmoral qualities. As a product 
of her moral efforts in achieving moral perfection, she also cultivates 
nonmoral excellence within herself, as shown in section II. Given these 
reasons, if a Loving Saint is already committed to the understanding 
that it is good for others to pursue a nonmoral project, it would be 
natural for her to think that for herself as well.
IV. IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO VALUE NONMORAL 
PRACTICES?
Wolf agrees that a Loving Saint could, for instance, recognize that 
others love art for its own sake, and thus, support herself in her efforts 
to appreciate art if there is nothing more morally valuable to do with 
her resources.19 Wolf implied that if a Loving Saint saw the beauty in a 
work of art, while doing so, she would unavoidably value it for its own 
sake. The problem is that, in a certain hypothetical situation, the saint 
might face a tension between her moral sainthood requiring her to 
donate to a food bank for maximal general happiness and her genuine 
18 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 420.
19 Wolf, email message to author.
appreciation of nonmoral interests making her want to spend that 
money to go to a museum to enjoy art for its own sake. While there 
are people who love art so much that sometimes they make the latter 
choice, a Loving Saint will be inclined to do what is strictly moral. 
This means that while a Loving Saint appreciates nonmoral virtues, 
such appreciation is not free of saintly moral duties or concerns. Wolf 
explained that in this case, the Loving Saint appreciates art in the right 
way but does so weakly; she truly loves art but gives it up at the drop of 
a moral hat.20 To introduce Wolf’s idea as a formal objection, one might 
contend that a Loving Saint’s appreciation of nonmoral values remains 
weak even after the realization that nonmoral interests are crucial to 
human well-being. This is because a Loving Saint will always be willing 
to exchange her enjoyment of nonmoral activities for other things that 
produce a greater amount of general happiness.21 I respond that there is 
no reason to think that a moral saint’s willingness to give up nonmoral 
activities in the face of a moral demand indicates her shallowness of 
attachment to the former. As shown in sections II and III, a moral 
saint develops nonmoral virtues as a necessary journey to successful 
moral sainthood, and she also sees the true value of nonmoral activities 
outside of moral contexts. These qualities remain in her even if she has 
to prioritize moral duties, and questioning her depth of commitment 
to nonmoral values in these instances of conflict seems to be a different 
question.
On the other hand, a plausible counterpoint I see here is that the 
Loving Saint’s consideration for her moral duties in giving up nonmoral 
activities signifies that her engagement in nonmoral interests will always 
involve moral perspectives, which might indicate a wrong approach to 
nonmoral values. However, what I see going on here is not the Loving 
Saint valuing nonmoral interests less than moral ones as a result of her 
moral concerns, but her valuing nonmoral things from both moral 
and nonmoral perspectives. In “Persons, Character and Morality,” 
Bernard Williams discusses Charles Fried’s example of a man who 
takes both moral permissibility and personal relationship into account 
in his decision to save his wife’s life over his friend’s, given that the 
two people are in an equal situation of danger.22 Williams responds by 
saying, “But this construction provides the agent with one thought too 
many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) 
that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought 
that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this 
20 Wolf, email message to author.
21 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 429-30.
22 Charles Fried, “The Value of Life,” Harvard Law Review 82, no. 7 (1969): 
1432-33, 10.2307/1339754.
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kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.”23 Williams assumes that if a 
man chooses to save his wife, the optimal reason to do so is that she 
was his loved one, not because it was his moral duty. He asserts that if 
the man starts to think about the moral permissibility in this situation, 
such moral concern indicates that he is now having “one thought too 
many.”24 I agree with the view that it is wrong for the man to save his 
wife solely for moral reasons, but I do not find it an issue to take into 
account both nonmoral interests (his love toward the wife) and the 
moral permissibility in making such a decision. For instance, after the 
man rescues his wife, he might put his daily duties or activities aside 
to visit his wife at the hospital, and there might be two reasons behind 
doing so: one is he loves his wife, and the other is it is morally right 
to visit his wife. I do not find a reason for the man’s moral reflection 
to bring “one thought too many” for him as the fact that his decision 
involved moral considerations does not diminish his nonmoral interest, 
or in this case, the love he has for his wife. These are simply two 
different spheres of consideration and the fact that the man’s conduct 
involved both nonmoral and moral interests does not signify that he 
is treating the other virtue shallowly. I believe that there is nothing 
intrinsically inconsistent with the Loving Saint’s moral sainthood about 
valuing nonmoral things both morally and nonmorally at the same 
time. For example, when a Loving Saint engages in developing musical 
talents, she might be doing so to increase overall utility in the world 
to achieve her moral ends, but she may also value and appreciate such 
nonmoral activities outside of utilitarian moral contexts. This does not 
signify that the Loving Saint is lightly treating the nonmoral project but 
regards it as valuable, both morally and nonmorally, which is possible, 
if not good. It is not misguided for a Loving Saint to value nonmoral 
things from both moral and nonmoral perspectives, and it might be an 
overstatement to say someone is weakly attached to a nonmoral project 
if there is a slightest moral consideration involved in doing so.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSION: ARE MORAL AND 
NONMORAL QUALITIES CONNECTED?
So far, I have shown that moral saints cannot perform their moral 
duties without nonmoral virtues and will develop such qualities to 
successfully meet their moral ends. Furthermore, a Loving Saint 
will be able to value nonmoral practices for their own sake as she 
understands, through observation, that they are essential to others’ and 
humankind’s flourishing. To the worry that a Loving Saint’s ability to 
see the true value of nonmoral practices in others does not mean that 
23 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” 17-18.
24 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” 17-18.
she can do so in herself, I respond that the extension of a Loving Saint’s 
attitude toward other people is a product of her care for them, and 
their flourishing can be built in for herself as well. In response to the 
other concern that moral saints value nonmoral practice in a shallow 
manner—as they might ultimately prioritize morality—I suggest that 
a moral saint is merely valuing nonmoral qualities from both nonmoral 
and moral perspectives, which is consistent with moral sainthood. My 
claim in this essay has been that both moral and nonmoral qualities 
are essential for moral sainthood, as a Loving Saint needs to cultivate 
nonmoral excellence to attain moral perfection, while she values the 
nonmoral interests the right way.
I would like to end by exploring the possibility that nonmoral and 
moral qualities are intertwined. Wolf argues that moral saints can only 
cultivate nonmoral qualities by accident while pursuing their moral 
ends.25 The fact that the pursuit of a moral quality may naturally lead 
to an acquisition of a nonmoral quality suggests that these two aspects 
are intertwined, as one might entail the other. This can be further 
demonstrated by Wolf’s examples of what constitutes cultural ideals 
and my argument of what moral sainthood requires of moral saints. 
Wolf implies that some degree of morality is a necessary condition of 
personal excellence when she gives examples of people who are not 
moral saints but are cultural ideals, as she mentions, “there is certainly 
nothing immoral about the ideal characters or traits.”26 What this 
suggests is that there is a minimal bar of moral permissibility that one 
has to cross in order for the life dedicated to nonmoral qualities to be 
acceptable. Similarly, moral saints must have some virtues that, strictly 
speaking, are nonmoral to achieve their moral ends. For instance, 
there are figures who seem to be maximally moral but are lacking in 
practical or nonmoral abilities which get in their way of attaining moral 
perfection. Nonmoral qualities are indispensable to moral sainthood 
as one cannot pursue the task of caring for others’ welfare without a 
genuine understanding or acquisition of such qualities.
Engaging with “Moral Saints” and Wolf’s personal insight, I 
understood that her ultimate conclusion is not that life dedicated to 
morality is unattractive, but nonmoral virtues are just as valuable as 
moral ones. Nonetheless, Wolf might have overstated the potential 
criticisms of the moral saint in the process of making her argument that 
life dedicated to nonmoral ideals is defensible. As nonmoral and moral 
spheres are connected, I believe that it would be possible to emphasize 
the pursuit of nonmoral qualities without necessarily criticizing 
or undermining the life dedicated to moral sainthood as barren or 
undesirable.
25 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 425.
26 Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 422.
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